









Aion is like a child playing a game.
 heraclitus1 




Eugen Fink is best known in the English language for his work continuing the studies of  husserl and for his 
seminar on heraclitus with heidegger.3 as ronald Bruzina writes, his work with husserl is so important that 
“husserl’s phenomenology, at least as it reached its maturity in his last years, was not just Husserl’s – it was 
husserl’s and Fink’s”.4 indeed, of  one key piece by Fink, husserl himself  states that “it contains no sentence 
which i could not completely accept as my own or openly acknowledge as my own conviction”.5 Following 
husserl’s death Bruzina notes that Fink would complete husserl’s work, “not in contravention to husserl’s 
phenomenology but not in literal orthodoxy to it either”.6 the Sixth Cartesian Meditation of  Fink can be seen 
in this context. as Bruzina notes, the Cartesian Meditations are “no longer, in Fink’s revision, very ‘cartesian’!”7 
Bruzina makes a similar case for a reading of  the heraclitus seminar that does not take heidegger as the prime 
figure, suggesting that this “would be truer to the text”.8 indeed, as krell notes, while Fink offers heidegger 
the “intellectual leadership” of  the seminar, “it is Fink’s proposed interpretations which guide the discussion 
throughout”.9 
of  course, this is not to suggest Fink is of  the same stature as husserl or heidegger, but to recognise that he 
is an important phenomenological thinker entirely in his own right.10 this is not substantially developed in 
the literature, with most of  the attention in English, French and german being to Fink in relation to husserl 
or heidegger.11 While it is undoubtedly true that Fink’s ideas more generally are forged between the twin 
influences of  Husserl and Heidegger, this mode of  approach is necessarily partial. The literature tends to 
concentrate on the early Fink and his relation to husserl,12 and yet while there are, for example, certainly links 
between husserl’s notion of  Lebenswelt and Fink’s work on world,13 there are differences in the later writings. 
similarly, while Fink followed heidegger’s courses for a number of  years, especially those between 1928 and 
1931, when he “took detailed notes”,14 what literature there is on this relation only discusses the heidegger/
Fink seminar on heraclitus. in terms of  the deeper linkages, we could note that in the 1928 course Introduction 
to Phllosophy, heidegger notes that “world is the title for the play [das Spiel] that the transcendence [of  dasein 
as such] plays. Being-in-the-world is the original playing of  the play which every factic dasein must get into in 
order to be able to play itself  out in such a way that all through its existence this or that is the game played [on 
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factic dasein]”.15 this from a section of  the course entitled “Welt als ‘spiel des lebens’”, World as ‘life Play’.16 
as Bruzina notes, “Fink underlined every sentence in this passage”.17
this is a theme to which heidegger would return many times, suggesting in the 1950s that “the essence of  
being is the game itself  [das Spiel selber]”18 Perhaps particularly significant for Fink is the 1929/30 course The 
Fundamental Concepts of  Metaphysics, with its discussion of  world in relation to animals.19 this course is dedicated 
by heidegger to the “memory of  Eugen Fink”, who died shortly before heidegger himself. heidegger surmises 
that “something unthought of  [Fink’s] own that determined his way” was sparked by this course.20 as heidegger 
suggests in an appendix to that course, which is a speech for Fink on his sixtieth birthday, written ten years 
prior to the dedication, Fink exemplifies Nietzsche’s suggestion that “one repays a teacher badly if  one always 
remains merely a student”.21 Yet in following his own way, this was a course central to Fink. as heidegger notes 
in 1975, “over the past decades he repeatedly expressed the wish that this lecture should be published before 
all others”.22 
What these linkages show is that many of  the works Fink undertook between husserl’s death in 1938 and the 
1966/67 seminar with Heidegger, are influenced by both Husserl and Heidegger. But it is important to note 
that, unlike the works on and for husserl, or the seminar with heidegger, they are independent studies.23 they 
would undoubtedly merit English translation, something that has happened to only a few essays and more 
recently his book on nietzsche.24 ronald Bruzina’s important and pioneering work on the relation between 
husserl and Fink acts as a theoretical prelude to these post-war works of  Fink’s. a case for translation can 
perhaps especially be made of  Spiel als Weltsymbol, Play as symbol of  the World.25
tWo sPurs: thE child and PhEnoMEnologY
For Fink a key source of  inspiration for thinking the question of  the world is a fragment of  heraclitus, number 
52 in the diels-kranz numbering. heraclitus declares that eternity, or time [aion], standing as a cipher for the 
world, is “like a child playing a game”.26 Fink usually translates aion either as time or as terms including the 
notion of  world such as Weltlauf, course of  the world.27 But the temporal and spatial aspects of  this term are 
perhaps best captured by heidegger’s translation of  aion as Weltzeit, time of  the world;28 although he also used 
Seinsgeschick, a term to which i will return.29 in Fink’s reading of  heraclitus the notion of  aion is linked to other 
key terms. as schenk-Mair notes, in an important book entitled Die Kosmologie Eugen Finks, “Fink’s thinking 
is cosmological and its central concept is the world as a whole. the concept of  the world is derived from 
heraclitus’s physis”.30 Fink similarly links the notion of  aion to the divine fire, or the lightning that charts the 
course of  the world.31 as sallis and Maly suggest, concerning the Heraclitus Seminar, “it is the rhythm of  conflict 
and accord between heidegger’s ‘logical’ reading of  the fragments and Fink’s ‘pyrological’ or ‘cosmological’ 
reading that gives the seminar its momentum and makes it a testimony to the concrete practice of  thinking”.32 
in their reading heidegger moves from logos to fire; Fink the reverse.33 as krell notes, fragment 52 is not 
discussed in this seminar, but all the themes in it are: “it is thus the shadow of  the philosopher’s inquiry, being 
present yet absent”.34
World, for Fink, which is a term he sometimes employs without an article, should not be understood as reified, 
but as something fluid and in motion. Following the suggestion from Heraclitus, Fink’s argument is that “play 
can become the symbolic theatrical enactment of  the universe, the speculative metaphor of  the world”.35 thus 
“play is both a cosmic symbol and a symbol of  the cosmos”.36 Yet while ‘world’ is the key philosophical focus of  
his later work, the basis for this is clearly indicated in a note from as early as 1934 where he lists “consciousness 
of  world and world” as a theme for further study; and one from 1936 when he outlines “the metaphysics of  
play” as the first item in a list of  the “‘philosophy’ that may perhaps lie in my life”. This programme of  work is 
something he explicitly outlines as he enters his thirtieth year.37 
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thus, for Fink, 
the transcending of  the world which takes place in performing the phenomenological reduction does 
not lead outside of  or away from the world to an origin which is separate from the world (and to which 
the world is connected only by some relation) as if  leading to some other world; the phenomenological 
transcending of  the world, as the disclosure of  transcendental subjectivity, is at the same time the 
retention of  the world within the universe of  absolute ‘being’ that has been exposed. the world remains 
immanent to the absolute and is discovered as lying within it.38
Fink argues that “the true theme of  phenomenology is neither the world on the one hand, nor a transcendental 
subjectivity which is to be set over and against the world on the other, but the world’s becoming in the constitution of  
transcendental subjectivity”.39 as Fink recognises, “husserl’s unpublished manuscripts already constitute an extensive 
carrying out of  the constitutive interpretation of  the world”.40 Yet this analysis is not simply of  the world in a 
Husserlian sense. Fink wants to broaden his analysis beyond simply theoretical reflections on the world: “The 
broadening of  the conception beyond mere phenomenological analysis is reflected in the alternate titles it 
receives in his notes: in 1934, ‘the history of  the concept of  World’; and in 1935, ‘historical-systematic 
studies on the theory of  the concept of  ‘World’”.41 thus krell characterises Fink as simultaneously pursuing 
“hermeneutics and ontology” in his study of  play.42
in his study of  the early material, Bruzina notes that 
as the idea progressed it became quite comprehensive: historical, critical, investigative. this is 
manifest in the longest and most detailed outline he produced, fifteen pages of  handwritten text 
probably from 1936. here more space is devoted to kant than to husserl, and even heidegger 
gets more mention than husserl, although all three are critically treated. now entitled ‘World and 
World-concept: a Problem-theoretical investigation”, the projected work seems to be intended as 
a full delineation of  the lines needed to raise the issue of  the world properly, in all the dimensions 
that philosophic labours have so far discovered for it, rather than to work out and demonstrate a final 
positive doctrinal solution.43
Bruzina’s reading yields a number of  important insights in term of  how Fink’s problematic is derived from 
a phenomenological position. Fink’s contribution, in part, was to “set the theme of  the world squarely in 
the position of  dominant topic in the new presentation of  phenomenology”. Fink was to reorder husserl’s 
materials, published and unpublished, and the theme of  the world was intended to be “the ariadne thread 
that could take the reader through the vast maze of  husserl’s analyses of  detail in critical reconsideration, 
systematic coherence, and integrating reinterpretation”.44 thus the world arises as a problem for Fink not 
out of  heidegger’s formulation of  the issue in the lectures developing from Being and Time, but from a more 
fundamental grasp of  why that problem would have arisen for heidegger. “transcendental phenomenology 
began in the recognition that the world had to be taken explicitly precisely as an overwhelmingly comprehensive 
structure that remained yet to be thematized properly in philosophy”.45
But the roots of  this mode of  thinking go back further still. Fink claims that he does “not think the cosmological 
from out of  heraclitus”, despite the undoubted spur to his thinking, “but rather from out of  kant and from 
the antinomy of  pure reason”.46 Equally he claims that Kant’s philosophy can be seen “as the first exhibiting 
of  the cosmological horizon of  the idea of  being”;47 and that in kant it becomes a problem of  general ontology and a 
special question of  metaphysics.48 nonetheless, his work is orientated around a central perspective on this: “is 
a non metaphysical thinking of  the world possible?”49 thus the work with husserl, through to post 1938 works 
continuing this project, to the post-war works of  his more independent thought can thus be linked through 
this theme. Bruzina concludes with this insight, although he does not elaborate the links at length. as he notes, 
“the suggestion of  organic development from Fink’s first years through to his independent endeavours after the 




these issues come together most explicitly in Spiel als Weltsymbol. in this book Fink sets himself  an ambitious 
task, to look at the notion of  play in myth, ritual and philosophy; a complex analysis which explores the relation 
of  the play or the game to the world.51 Its final chapter, on ‘The Worldliness of  the Human Game’ is particularly 
key. this book is important for its mediation between ancient and modern sources, and for acting as a bridge 
between the german and French intellectual traditions, a point to which i return in conclusion. 
Fink suggests that to understand play, we must understand the world, and to understand the world as play, we 
must gain a much more profound insight into the world”,52 and thus his “research on play is subordinated to the 
treatment of  a fundamental philosophical project. this problem is that of  the relation between the human and 
the world”.53 Yet despite this fundamental importance, Fink contends that play or the game has tended to be 
devalued in the metaphysical tradition – as mimesis, imitation, or even further as copy, or as mirror image.54 Fink 
contends that image is the generally neutral rendering; less than this is a copy; but more than this is a symbol. 
This is what he suggests that play can be, something that signifies rather than imitates.55 More than merely 
something which indicates or represents something else, “a symbolon is a fragment destined to be complete”.56
Equally, as well as being devalued, it has also been supplanted. as krell explains: “For the greeks, play, paizo, 
is what a child, pais, does”.57 Yet in the later Plato, “Paidia is subordinated to padeia or pedagogy, the latter 
conceived on the model of  technique”.58 Play thus becomes instrumentalised, subordinated to technique. Play 
is devalued and supplanted, and the world totalised and objectified, rendered understandable through the 
operations of  technology. to begin to grasp it through play may open up other possibilities. For Fink, “the world 
is not an object; it is perhaps rather the region of  all regions, the space of  all spaces, and the time of  all times”;59 
“the word ‘world’ becomes the title for the whole of  being”;60 “the world is therefore the collective name for all 
that occurs, for all that there is [es gibt] in general”.61 indeed it raises fundamental ontological questions, since 
“our understanding of  being is thoroughly linked to the world”.62 Fink thus states that “the being of  beings and 
the being worldly of  things are almost synonyms”.63
The Human, the World, Space
the question of  the human’s relation to the world is a “particular aspect of  the relation between the intrawordly 
being and the world which embraces everything”.64 thus “all things in general are intraworldly, or to put it 
differently, the being of  all beings is necessarily grasped as ‘being-in-the-world’”.65 Yet, the human perspective 
on this is unique, a point Fink develops from heidegger. For heidegger being-in-the-world is a particular 
characteristic of  human existence, Dasein, and while other things necessarily are in the world, this is not to make 
the same point.66 although Fink takes forward the idea that being-in is not to be understood in a predominantly 
spatial sense for Dasein – at least, not in the sense of  a spatial container – his is equally not a purely human 
analysis.67 he wants to distinguish two senses of  the term being-in-the-world. First, the being-in of  all things 
within the universe; second, being-in-the-world of  humans, “marked by a worldly/cosmic [weltbezug] relation 
of  understanding”.68 But this is not a rigid distinction, because the former is included, folded into, the latter. all 
finite things have place and duration, within space and time. Yet, like Heidegger, Fink wants to retain something 
unique about thinking about the world, something that the standard usage of  the term tends to miss. We speak 
too easily of  the ‘world of  the middle ages’; the ‘European world’; the ‘world of  the child’.69 
Fink thus wants to mediate between a heideggerian conception and a kantian one. For kant space and time 
are a priori forms of  intuition through which we perceive the world. kant describes them as “the ground of  all 
intuitions… the condition of  possibility of  appearances, not as a determination dependent on them”.70 thus 
they are frames through which we encounter the world rather than characteristics of  it as such.71 in the early 
heidegger space, in particular, is seen as a characteristic of  Dasein, and derivative from temporality. this is not 
the case in his later work, where he is concerned with thinking the relation between space and time rather than 
either of  their derivative natures. this is a position endorsed by Fink, who argues that “original temporality as 
-
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the meaning of  the being of  transcendental subjectivity is always spatial”.72 Bruzina notes that in doing this, 
“Fink wishes to emphasize is the way the integration of  space with time means the ultimate time-flow is itself  
also the action of  the constitutive deployment of  the world”.73 Fink’s position is thus similar to heidegger, and 
in distinction to kant, because he wants to think the idea of  space from the interpretation of  world, rather 
than the other way round.74 it is for this reason that he argues that “the worldly position [Weltstellung] of  the 
human is not an objective situation [Lage] in a space [Raum] comprised of  a homogeneous system of  positions 
[Stellensystem]; nor is it a duration within a plurality of  uniform durations”.75 this is therefore an attempt to 
recognise that a cartesian or newtonian system of  homogenous space is profoundly limited in grasping the 
world. instead we need to grasp that from the perspective of  play. “the space and time of  the ludic world 
[Spielweltraum… Spielweltzeit] are neither place [Ort] nor duration within ‘real’ space and time”.76 
this position was elaborated as early as his Sixth Cartesian Meditation
the world as the total unity of  the really existent [Seienden], boundlessly open in space and time, with 
the whole immensity of  nature filling it, with all the planets, Milky Ways, and solar systems; with 
the multiplicity of  existents such as stones, plants, animals, and humans; as soil and living space for 
human cultures, for their rise and fall in the turn of  history; as locale for final ethical and religious 
decisions; the world in this manifoldness of  its existence [Dasein] – in a word, being [das Sein] – is only 
a moment of  the Absolute.77
Being Worldly
Yet the nature of  the relation between the human and the world is not readily understood. as Fink puts it, “the 
human lives everyday in the world, but not in relation with the world”.78 similarly he suggests that “the human is a 
being in the world; worldly in the way that they are found like all things in the universe, and worldly in the way 
they are open to the world”.79 We must therefore ensure we do not think human and world as distinct, even as 
we think their relation. Fink contends that the relation between the human and the world is prior to either of  
these terms. this is, as Fink acknowledges, perhaps the hardest aspect to grasp. “the relation between the human 
and the world, as it manifests itself  in the human game, is not a relation between two separate matters, but it is 
preceded by a relation of  difference between what is reunited in their relation”.80
Fink thus uses the idea of  the ‘worldly’ in four senses
the intrawordly being of  all things and events1. 
not the items within the totality, but the totality of  being 2. as such – what gives time and space and those 
things that are within them; and in particular the guiding, governing or steering nature of  this
a fundamental and decisive trait of  human existence; dasein’s way of  comporting itself  toward the 3. 
world, a understanding of  that relation. the grasp of  the ontological and the openness to the world, 
derived from the fundamental determination of  the human as the zoon logon echon. the human is thus 
“more worldly” than other things, such as a stone, tree or animal.
a derogatory meaning that implies the worldly as the sensual, not spiritual; a Pagan rather than 4. 
Christian sense; worldly as the equivalent of  the fraility of  the flesh.81
Fink suggests that human play can be said to be worldly in the first, third and fourth of  these senses.82 krell 
helpfully outlines these different meanings in Fink’s work. “it is an intramundane activity of  innerworldly 
beings, it is an exceptional mode of  dasein’s behaviour towards the world, and it is a pre-christian, pre-
metaphysical, hence ‘pagan’ activity”.83
Yet it is the second of  these meanings that is crucial to the ontological grasping of  the significance of  the relation 
between play and the world. Play in a non-metaphysical sense can provide insight into this relation, yet it is not 
something that can be seen as initiated or even guided by the human. Play is a cosmic symbol and a symbol of  
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the cosmos; it produces and realises the ontological difference. Yet this is play without subject: “the world is play 
without a player”;84 “the play of  the world is not the play of  a person”.85 this is the meaning of  Fink’s suggestion 
that the human and the world are not related as two separate things, but are both “enclosed… and disclosed 
together”.86
Fink’s claim here can be related to heidegger’s reading of  heraclitus’ fragment. For heidegger “the child at 
play is the Seinsgeschick”, the fateful sending of  being”.87 this notion, related to the Ereignis that is the propriating 
event of  being, is what gives space and time. Paralleling angelus silesius’s line about the rose, heidegger suggests 
that the child of  the ‘play of  the world’ “plays, because it plays”. heidegger’s claim is that “the ‘because’ is 
subsumed [versinkt] in the game. the game is without ‘why’”. For heidegger, the “play of  the world” is thus the 
“sending [Geschick] of  being”. 88
kostas axElos, hEnri lEFEBvrE and MOnDIALISATIOn
this argument can also be found in two French language writers, whose ideas are beginning to be related to the 
thinking of  the world. The first of  these is Kostas Axelos, a Greek émigré who arrived in France in 1945 and who 
took up a place at the very centre of  French intellectual life. axelos developed these ideas in his own writings, 
notably Le jeu du monde,89 and also in some of  the texts he chose to have translated for the Arguments book series 
he edited.90 these translations included Fink’s Spiel als Weltsymbol, which appeared in 1966;91 as well as Fink’s 
study of  nietzsche and one on phenomenology; Marcuse’s Eros and Civilisation; and Wilfrid desan’s Planetary 
Man. in his Le jeu du monde axelos makes a number of  related claims to Fink, notably that play and the world 
need to be thought in relation; and that the making-worldly of  phenomena is through a logic implicit only to 
itself, without external cause or purpose. For axelos, it means that the world can only be understood through 
this continual process of  becoming.92 thus for both Fink and axelos the true sense of  heraclitus is that the 
play is without a player. What happens to the child? as krell asks, “is the world the play of  an innocent, or is it 
innocent of  players? The first can be properly thought only through the second: when the child plays there is 
no player. Everything is played”.93
these themes are also developed in the work of  the second of  these thinkers, henri lefebvre, particularly in 
his 1970s works The Production of  Space and De l’État. lefebvre is interested in the question of  the world, le monde, 
both in terms of  a level of  production – the notion of  l’échelle mondiale, the worldwide scale – and through his 
term mondialisation. Mondialisation can only imperfectly be translated as globalization, but is rather the process 
of  becoming-worldly, seizing and grasping the world as a whole, comprehending it as a totality, as an event in 
thought and practice. For lefebvre, the writings of  axelos provide intellectual formulations for thinking through 
these issues, even if  his analyses, like those of  Fink and heidegger, lapse into speculative metaphysics.94
While lefebvre’s principal reference on this topic is axelos, he acknowledges Fink’s writings, even as they 
are filtered, for him, through the work of  Axelos. Lefebvre also explicitly acknowledges the importance of  
heidegger’s work, as he does elsewhere, even as he critiques it. lefebvre is particularly taken by heidegger’s 
famous suggestion in the 1929 essay “on the Essence of  ground” that the “world never is, but worlds”.95 
developing the insights of  Fink and axelos, lefebvre considers that this near tautology allows us to grasp how 
the world operates independently, devoid of  an external cause or trigger. 
the world-wide [le mondial] conceives itself  in and by itself  and not by another thing (history, spirit, 
work, science, etc.). the world becomes world, becoming what virtually it was. it transforms itself  
by becoming worldwide. in it discovery and creation converge. it does not exist before it creates 
itself, and yet, it proclaimed itself, possible-impossible, through all the powers, technology, knowledge, 
art.96 
But just as axelos and Fink do, lefebvre and heidegger both refer back to heraclitus. 
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lefebvre and axelos thus both discuss the process of  mondialisation, a process of  world-isation or a becoming-
worldwide. axelos contends that mondialisation is worth preserving as an alternative to ‘globalisation’ not for 
narrow linguistic reasons of  French versus English, but rather because it retains the notion of  the ‘world’, le 
monde, and therefore has a connection to the notion of  the ‘world’ which globalisation no longer preserves.97
Globalisation names a process which universalises technology, economy, politics, and even civilisation 
and culture. But it remains somewhat empty. the world, as an opening is missing. the world is not 
the physical and historical totality, it is not the more or less empirical ensemble of  theoretical and 
practical ensembles. it deploys itself. the thing that is called globalisation is a kind of  mondialisation 
without the world.98
thus for both axelos and lefebvre the world is an object of  thought in its own terms, rather than understandable 
through other means or substitutes. to think mondialisation before we think about globalization may be a powerful 
means of  introducing a material and philosophical basis to the thinking of  the space of  the world.99 lefebvre 
argues that the notion of  the mondial, and the process of  mondialisation is not an absolute solution, but that it gives 
us important insight into contemporary problems:
Sometimes it obscures, sometimes it illuminates: global by definition, it does not just deal with the 
economic, nor the sociological in isolation; neither demography separately, nor traditional historicity 
taken as criteria of  direction. it implies the criticism of  separations, especially if  they have had their 
moment and their need. here we try to grasp it through a process of  mondialisation of  the state, which 
supposes the world market, world technicality, etc. but which goes beyond these determinations.100
globalisation is thus made possible by a prior grasping of  the world as a totality, the process of  mondialisation. 
While lefebvre’s notion of  mondialisation has begun to be excavated politically,101 the argument here is that 
precisely because it provides a philosophical and practical account of  the world, theoretically grounded and 
politically aware, it needs to be understood in terms of  its philosophical heritage. the suggestion here is that, 
though filtered through Axelos, and inherently indebted to Heraclitus, Marx and Heidegger, it is one in implicit 
dialogue with the writings of  Eugen Fink.
Fink’s Spiel als Weltsymbol is therefore a largely untapped philosophical resource for thinking about the world, 
and the process of  becoming-world. such a sustained thinking provides a way of  beginning the practice 
of  addressing axelos’s well-made complaint that globalization is a kind of  mondialisation without the world. 
globalisation is understood as a political or economic process, most thought of  which fails to comprehend the 
world or the globe over which this is extended. this is the case in both material and philosophical senses. to 
begin to undertake this analysis, we can see the potential for rethinking the way the world is constructed that 
does not simply fall into mechanistic, technocratic ways of  rendering. 
one of  the key consequences of  this is that thinking the world of  globalisation forces us to realise that this is 
not a transcending of  spatial or territorial problematics. globalisation does not mean the end of  geography, but 
rather its reconfiguration within existing terms. Territory, understood as the political corollary of  calculative 
space, offers us insight into the world scale, or the notion of  the worldwide. this is because the spatiality of  
globalisation is a matter of  scale, a difference of  degree rather than an ontological transformation. second, that 
the process of  globalisation is therefore an acceleration of  the homogenous understanding of  space and time, 
as coordinates on a three and four dimensional grid. the understanding of  space and time as calculative, and 
extension as the primary characteristic of  material nature is to make it amenable to science through geometry 
and measure more generally. In Leibniz we find the claim that “cum Deus calculat fit mundus”; “as god calculates, 
the world comes to be”.102 heidegger’s retranslation is that “as god plays, world comes to be”.103 Fink and 
axelos begin to give us some insight into how that might be the case.
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